Currently, I work as
a substitute teacher so I don’t have much insight into the strategy of my local
county school system. However, I did
have a career in the U.S. Army that spanned two decades and witnessed how its (the
Army) strategy has evolved over time.
The strategy that I am speaking about refers to the Army’s doctrine to
warfighting. To scope the concept of
warfighting strategy down even further, I am referring to the strategy employed
during the “Cold War” to the current strategy to address the “Global War on
Terror” (GWOT). The “Cold War” was a
period beginning in 1947 (after World War II) and ending in 1991 (History, n.d.) . The general strategy was to stop the spread
of communism and to contain its agents (History, n.d.) . This strategy of containment was relatively
simple (compared to GWOT strategy) because the agents were easily identifiable e.g.
the Soviet Union, Cuba, etc., and their agenda was to spread communism (History, n.d.) . As needed, the Army’s warfighting strategy
was to amass large combat forces against an aggressor in a defined geographical
area.
Although the U.S. had been fighting terrorism
decades before, it could be strongly argued that the “Global War on Terror”
began on the day of September 11, 2001.
On that day, terrorists hijacked planes and flew them into the World
Trade towers, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania (History, n.d.) .
From that day on, the U.S. Army was now tasked to fight a different
enemy. Yet, the strategy used during the
Cold War e.g. containment, would not apply here. The GWOT was very complex and very chaotic. The agents of terrorism were not easily
identifiable – they could be lone individuals or groups of any nation, ethnicity,
or geographical area. Moreover, a
terrorist’s motive and agenda could be spurred by countless factors. Needless to say, the Army had to adapt its
strategy to meet these new complexities. The Army adapted in these ways (but not
limited to these examples). First, the
Army became a modular force. The Army
developed Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) that were comprised of several functional
specialisms e.g. infantry, artillery, aviation, and sustainment battalions (Global Security, n.d.) . The BCT is akin to the ‘matrix’ organization –
the matrix organization is cross-functional, assigned to a product line or
region (Obolensky, 2014, p. 25) . Second, the Army had to adapt to confront a
variety of operations (we’ll refer as product lines) – it would no longer be
just a warfighting machine. For
instance, in the context of the GWOT, the “product line” is the type of contingency
operation e.g. direct combat action, humanitarian support, stability and
support operations (SASO) aka “nation building”, etc. (Wright, 2010) . Although humanitarian
support and SASO may not seem like a fit in fighting terrorism, they are. The objective is not only to contain but also
to prevent the behaviors that cultivate terrorism (Wright, 2010) .
Though I am no longer in the Army, I
envision that it will continue to adapt to the ever growing complexities of a
world in which socio-economics, religion, culture, etc. can motivate the U.S.’s
enemies. It must continue to evolve from
a ‘matrix’ type organization to a CAS (Complex Adaptive System)
organization. Instead of having modular
BCTs, the Army must have the capability for units/teams that are “formed,
perform and then disappear as the need arises” (Obolensky, 2014, p. 26) . This is especially true in a time of military
downsizing and reduced defense budget spending where the Army must still meet
its mission but with fewer resources (Thompson, 2013) .
References
Global
Security. (n.d.). Retrieved from www.globalsecurity.org:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/bua-list.htm
History. (n.d.).
Retrieved from www.history.com:
http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cold-war-history
History. (n.d.). Retrieved
from www.history.com: http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks
Obolensky, N.
(2014). Complex adaptive leadership - Embracing paradox and uncertainty.
New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
Thompson, L.
(2013, May 13). Retrieved from www.forbes.com: http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2013/05/13/budget-cuts-are-killing-military-preparedness/#35410e6617dc
Wright, D. (2010,
May). Retrieved from usacac.army.mil:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdf
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